In January 2024, I requested a standard testing accommodation from the Association for Financial Counseling & Planning Education (AFCPE): remote proctoring, due to a long-term, well-documented disability. This same accommodation has been granted without issue by regulatory bodies like FINRA , the NMLS , and the Florida Department of Financial Services —each governing far more sensitive licensure regimes. AFCPE denied it. They demanded new medical documentation, closed the dialogue without resolution, and ultimately refused to engage in the kind of good faith, interactive process the ADA (42 U.S.C. § 12189)  explicitly mandates. When I filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Justice, the DOJ declined to intervene— not for lack of merit , but due to resource constraints. The case was never dismissed on grounds of legal insufficiency. It simply didn’t make the triage cut in a gutted civil rights division. Free legal clinics took no action. Pro bono counsel never responded. The systemic failure wasn't just within AFCPE. It extended across the very mechanisms meant to safeguard civil protections. This Isn’t About a Credential I no longer seek to hold the AFC designation. I’ve since outgrown the need for externally conferred legitimacy. Today, my work is followed by professionals managing over $28.5 trillion  in capital—nearly a quarter of global AUM. AFCPE’s refusal to engage says more about institutional rigidity than individual merit. This is about structural accountability. If institutions gate access to careers or credentials, they must be capable of honoring the rights of those they evaluate. AFCPE failed. What Comes Next I’ve formally requested a refund per their own written offer. That will be the final transaction between us. But this incident will remain part of the public record—not as a grievance, but as a case study in how systems collapse when they prioritize procedure over principle . If you're an aspiring financial professional facing similar barriers, know this: You don’t need gatekeepers who can’t see your value. Build systems. Reframe narratives. Or, if necessary, design a new credentialing logic entirely. That’s what we’ve done at Causality Partners. We credential relevance, not compliance. And we see you. — J.S. Faulkner Causality Partners St. Petersburg, FL

The defining Zweikampf  of the 21st century. The following contains one multidimensional lens by which to view the current conflict inspired by Clausewitz, a 19th-century Prussian general, who wrote On War, saying war is politics with fighting, driven by emotion, chance, and reason. His ideas on uncertainty ("fog of war") and inefficiencies ("friction") shape modern military and strategic thinking. United States The U.S. remains the preeminent global military power, with unmatched power projection via 11 carrier strike groups, over 750 overseas bases, and enduring control of global maritime routes. Its financial system anchors the dollar as the reserve currency, enabling sanction regimes and economic warfare at scale. It dominates the narrative across Western institutions, media, and multilateral frameworks. But it suffers from internal political incoherence, fiscal overextension, industrial hollowing, and declining trust from the Global South. Its strategic logic is reactive, fragmented, and more concerned with preserving hegemony than redefining purpose. → Likelihood of winning a kinetic war near China’s borders: ~20%. Cold war-style containment success: ~50%. China China plays the long game. It has built industrial, infrastructural, and technological superiority in key sectors (EVs, solar, high-speed rail, shipbuilding). It commands strategic chokepoints via the BRI and boasts the world’s largest standing military by personnel, the world’s largest navy by ship count, and advanced hypersonic capability. Domestically, it is unified, goal-aligned, and led by a technocratic elite unconstrained by election cycles. Its weaknesses: demographic headwinds, capital outflow pressures, and global narrative mistrust—largely engineered by Western soft power. But its strategy is rational, adaptive, and fundamentally expansionary in economic, not ideological, terms. → Likelihood of winning a kinetic war near Taiwan or SCS: ~80%. Winning a systemic economic-technological cold war: ~75%. Clausewitz would say: He wins who aligns means with ends, who possesses clarity of purpose, and who can transform will into force, without self-destruction. As of now, China understands this better. This may, or may not, be fully reflective of our position at any given time. It may be a sanitized version of what we feel is "safe" to publish.